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In this paper I offer a systematic account of actions of trust and inquire
into their cognitive motivation. I first develop the distinction and
relationship between attitudes and actions of trust, and then assess Paul
Faulkner's thesis that the Humean model cannot explain the cognitive
motivation of some actions of trust under circumstances of uncertainty.
While I will accept his diagnosis, I will contend that a weaker version of
the Humean model could provide this explanation. My proposal will be
an attempt to show why some doxastic characteristics of trust would
allow for this analysis. In particular, I will show how the nature of the
reliance relation, which constitutes actions of trust, requires that trustors
believe in the possibility of accomplishing their intentions by means of the
trusted party’s collaboration. I will argue that this means-end belief can
cognitively motivate trust even in situations where the trustor is uncertain
as to whether the trusted party will prove trustworthy.
1. Introduction
On the Humean account, a motivating reason for acting is a pair formed by a desire
and a means-end belief. If an agent has a motivating reason to ψ, this means that she2
desires X and that she has a belief representing the action of ψ-ing as a means to the
attainment of X. Thus, her action could be analysed in terms of a desire-belief pair
and we could conclude that, other things being equal, she acted as she did partly
2 See Smith 1987. Also, see Davidson 1963 and his notion of “primary reason”.
1 Christian Carbonell is pursuing a Master's degree in analytic philosophy at the University of Barcelona,
Spain. He is interested in human behaviour at large, with a special interest in its ethical and epistemic
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because she was cognitively motivated to so act – it was her means-end belief that, in
view of her desire, ultimately determined her to ψ.3
Now, the question may be raised as to whether all actions are necessarily motivated
in these terms. For instance, could there not be a case where an agent is motivated to
ψ although she does not believe that ψ-ing will make her satisfy her desire?
According to Paul Faulkner , this is at least possible when it comes to some actions4
of trust, as trusting can sometimes involve uncertainty about outcome - a leap of
faith as it were. In some specific situations where the trustor A desires something
following from the trusted party’s behaviour, it can happen that A does not believe
that the trusted party S will behave as expected, and so A might not believe that her
action of trusting S is a means to the satisfaction of her desire. In short, it can happen
that A lacks a belief of the sort ‘if I trust S to ϕ, I will get X’ and yet that A is
motivated to trust S to ϕ anyway. It then follows that trustors are not invariably
required to have a particular motivating reason R formed by a desire for X and a
means-end belief of the type just seen.
In this paper, I shall present and assess Faulkner’s proposal that some actions of trust
need not be motivated by R, and inquiry into whether there is an alternative
motivating reason that could cognitively motivate trust even under circumstances of
uncertainty. I will agree with Faulkner that the Humean model cannot always
account for the motivation of trust, but will contend that a weaker version of the
model could do the job instead in those situations. In particular, I will argue that the
actions of trust Faulkner has in mind can be motivated under such circumstances by
a weaker motivating reason Rw partly constituted by a weak means-end belief of the
sort ‘if I trust S to ϕ, then it is possible that I get X’. My point being that when A does
not need R she still needs Rw, since the belief that one’s action of trust is a means that
makes possible the satisfaction of one’s desire is needed to trust even under
conditions of uncertainty. I will base this contention on the relationship between
trust, competence, and intentionality.
2. What is it to trust?
2.1 Trust can be an attitude or an action
Faulkner’s thesis concerns the cognitive motivation of actions of trust. More
concretely, his argument against the Humean concerns actions of affective trust, as he
calls them. Before presenting his thesis in Section 2, it would be helpful to provide a
4 Faulkner 2014.
3 Recall Hume’s famous sentence “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” (Hume 1739/1960,
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definition for this type of action. To this end, I will first differentiate actions of trust
from attitudes of trust.
Trust can refer to an attitude or it can refer to a certain type of action that is done
with that attitude. Thus, if trust as an attitude is defined as a state of mind where the
trustor has positive expectations towards the trusted party’s behaviour (e.g. Fred
expects that George will pick him up at the airport, as opposed to the negative
expectation that George will not pick him up), then an action of trust consists in an
action that the trustor performs with those expectations. In particular, A’s action of5
trust is an action that in being performed A relies on S’s ϕ-ing and positively expects
something of S’s behaviour (e.g., Fred’s waiting for George or Fred’s not taking of a
taxi can be actions of trust, for in so doing Fred relies on George’s picking him up at
the airport and expects that George will do so). Remove the positive expectation and
you have mere reliance; remove reliance and you have simply the attitude of trust.
I will provide a definition of reliance shortly, but the point I want to stress now is
that, contrary to the attitude of trust, the defining feature of action of trust is that
they involve a relation of reliance. For the attitude alone does not imply reliance but
at most the disposition to rely on someone.
Consider a case where you trust your friend would not tell your romantic secrets to
anyone, but you have not even told her yet who your crush is. In this situation, you
would have just an attitude of trust towards your friend. You would simply expect
that if you were to tell her any secret she would not disclose it, and although this
expectation would dispose you to rely on her, you would not be relying on her yet.
Now, imagine another situation where you had an urge to confess your love for
someone and decided to confide the secret to her. As I see it, only in this latter case
would you be relying on her behaviour.
Roughly speaking, reliance is as a relation where A’s action depends on S’s ϕ-ing
where the nature of this dependence is intention-specific. Therefore, it could be said
that only if you told her the secret you would rely on your friend not disclosing it, in
the sense that an intention of your telling of the secret (e.g., the intention of putting
your mind at ease by privately confessing your love) would depend on your friend’s
behaviour (i.e., on her keeping the secret) to be accomplished. It is because her
keeping the secret would help you accomplish the circumstantial intention of your
action that you would be relying on her. So if in this situation you also put an
expectation on her, you would be then performing an action of trust. The telling of
5 As we will see, there can be two relevant kinds of expectations when it comes to trust, namely,
predictive and normative. This example here is an example of a positive predictive expectation (which
consists in the belief that S will ϕ), but I could have equally used an example of a positive normative
expectation (which consists in the belief that S should ϕ, which negation would consists in the belief
that S should not ϕ). So a positive expectation is either the belief that something will be the case or the
belief that something should be the case.
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your secret would qualify as an action of trust because in doing so you would be
relying on your friend keeping the secret and you would expect that she would keep
it.
This is why I consider actions of trust, contrary to mere attitudes, to involve an
intention-specific dependence between the trustor and the trusted. Attitudes of trust
do not involve this dependence in themselves precisely because when all you have is
the attitude, you do not yet rely on someone. When all you have is just the attitude,
you have not yet set out to accomplish any intention of yours by means of the
trusted party’s collaboration, so you do not yet depend on her doing anything. On
the other hand, actions of trust do involve this intention-specific dependence in
which reliance consists.6
I would like to make one last point to avoid confusion. As I said, trust can refer to an
attitude or an action. And the problem is that this twofold conceptualization does
not match our ordinary usage of the term ‘trust’. Indeed, on most occasions we use
‘trust’ to refer to the attitude alone, as when we say things like ‘I trust my colleagues
–they would never let me down’. Other times we use it to refer to a situation of mere
reliance, as when we explain ‘I had to trust the old bridge, for I had no choice but to
cross the river’. So, since we are interested in actions of trust, following our daily
trust talk might be philosophically misleading, because we use the term ‘trust’ in
situations where there is no reliance (like in the former case: you had not asked your
colleagues any favour yet, and so you do not rely on their doing something), as well
as in situations where there is no positive expectation (like in the latter case: you did
not positively expect the bridge would resist your weight, and probably you may
have expected otherwise).
2.2 Trust can be predictive or affective
Once the distinction between attitudes and actions is clear, it is possible now to
define two kinds of actions of trust, namely, actions of predictive trust and actions of
affective trust. To this end, I shall compare two scenarios inspired by Annette Baier’s
passing reflection on trust and Kant’s behaviour.7
7 Baier 1986, p. 235.
6 Perhaps there are actions that are actions of trust in themselves, presumably because they essentially
involve reliance and positive expectations. In any case, the fact I want to stress here is that most
actions of trust can be non-trusting actions as well. For instance, Fred’s not taking of a taxi can be a
non-trusting not taking of a taxi if the intention with which he does it does not depend on George’s
behaviour to be accomplished (i.e., if Fred does not rely on George). Fred could simply not take a taxi
and do so with the intention of not spending more money, instead of doing it with the intention of
being picked up by George. Since only this latter intention depends on George’s picking Fred up to be
accomplished (as Fred could save money by taking a walk home, say), the not taking of a taxi with the
intention of not spending more money would not qualify as an action of trust. This shows that the
relational state of the intention goes somewhat to define the trusting nature of the action.
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Scenario 1 (S1)
Kant was very regular with his habits. Every day, exactly at the same time, he would
go out for a walk. His neighbours from old Koenigsberg would regularly see him
passing by the same places at more or less the same time. Because Kant was that
regular in his exercise, it is not implausible to imagine a scenario where, say, the
nurses of a hospital used him as a sort of reminder: every time he would pass by the
hospital at a certain time, the nurses would give their patients their beverages
against typhus.
Scenario 2 (S2)
Imagine that, after a few days without news from Kant, a preoccupied nurse reaches
out to him. She lets him know about how she and her colleagues have been counting
on his regular walks to successfully do their job. She also tells him about some
catastrophic incidents that followed his unexpected not-going-out-for-a-walk. And
she goes on to beg him to please pass by the hospital each day, as the lives of her
patients are at risk. The philosopher therefore dutifully accepts her demand and
promises to pass by every day at the same time he usually passes by.
What are the similarities and differences between both scenarios? The first relevant
similarity is that the nurses stand in a relation of dependence with Kant’s doings,
where this dependence consists in relying on his punctual walks. By depending on
Kant’s punctuality, the nurses rely on his behaviour to accomplish the
intention-specific task of giving the medicines to their patients on time. And another
similarity, as I will show shortly, is that in both scenarios the nurses put a positive
expectation on Kant’s passing by at a certain time. Therefore, in each scenario, the
nurses perform an action of trust, namely, the action of giving the medicines to their
patients right when they see Kant passing by the hospital. For when they give the
medicines to their patients under these circumstances the intention with which they
do so depends on Kant’s punctually passing by.8
As for the differences, the first divergence between both scenarios can be drawn in
terms of the reactive attitudes that may be prompted. Whereas in S1 the nurses
might have felt “disappointed with [Kant] if he slept in one day, but not let down by
him, let alone had their trust betrayed” , in S2 they would have been entitled to9
present those sorts of attitudes (feelings of betrayal) towards him, after he had
promised to punctually pass by everyday. And the second and most important
9 Baier 1986, p. 235.
8 It may seem wrong to say that the giving of a medicine (or the waiting at the airport, the not taking
of a taxi, the telling of a secret, and so on) can qualify as an action of trust. As I see it, this should not
seem wrong as long as we agree with the Anscombe-Davidson thesis that actions are single events
that admit several descriptions. My point is then that the nurses’ giving of a medicine when they see
Kant passing by and the nurses’ action of trust are the same action, the same event, albeit described in
different ways. See Davidson 1969, and Anscombe 1979 for further discussion.
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distinction, which explains the first, has to do with the nature of the positive
expectation the nurses put on Kant. I borrow concepts from Martin Hollis in saying10
that, whereas in S1 the nurses held a predictive expectation on the philosopher, in S2
the expectation is rather normative.
When predictive expectations are held, the one who expects has a certain positive
expectation about the expectee’s future behaviour, often based on her regularity. The
nurses from S1 could have thought that Kant would perform again as he regularly
does (and then use him as a reminder), and may have believed something like ‘Kant
will pass by at t’. Indeed they may have reasoned ‘we can trust Kant will pass by at t,
because he always does’. Basically, they took his walks to be a regular thing for him
to do, and so predicted that he would do it again in the future at t and relied on his
walks at t because of this. This explains why they would have not been entitled to
feel betrayed: deceived predictions do not justify that reaction, just like unexpected
weather variations do not justifiably count as betrayal. Now, when it comes to
normative expectations, this is rather the other way round.
When expectations of this sort are held, the expector rather assumes the existence of
some normativity governing the expectee’s future behaviour. In particular, the
former can just expect the latter to act as expected due to a certain sort of
normativity she assumes to exist, regardless of any regularity she may be aware of.
Thus the nurses of S2 at t relied on Kant’s passing by, and they did also expect him to
be passing by at t, precisely because they assumed the existence of certain
normativity in his acceptance of the demand. Arguably, they may have thought
promises bound the promisor to act as promised, and so they may have grounded
their normative expectation on Kant’s behaviour for this reason. They may have
believed something like ‘Kant should pass by at t because he has so promised’, and
they may have reasoned ‘we can trust Kant will punctually pass by, because he has
committed himself to’.11
The point to be made here is that these differences in expectation account for two
ways in which trust can be understood, and consequently identify each scenario
with a particular kind of action of trust. Following Faulkner’s terminology , S112
concerns actions of predictive trust because they involve predictive expectations,
12 Faulkner 2007; Faulkner 2014.
11 Katherine Hawley (2014) has argued that the source of this normativity as applied to trust is
expressed commitment. Promises or agreements, as well as social norms or contracts, would therefore
justify having normative expectations. In this sense, Hawley proposes that to trust S to do something
is “to believe that she has a commitment to doing it and to rely upon her to meet that commitment.”
(Ibid., p. 10.)
10 Hollis 1998, p. 11.
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whilst S2 concerns actions of affective trust because they involve normative
expectations. I turn now to define each kind of action.13
As the name makes it explicit, the expectation characteristic of actions of predictive
trust is a sort of positive prediction. In this case, Faulkner remarks, “the expectation
that the trusted will do something is just the prediction or belief that they will do
so”. Trusting in this sense is therefore “a matter of a belief about the future, an14
inductive inference”. And this is precisely what happens in S1. The nurses expected15
Kant to pass by given his regularity in so doing: they predicted that he would pass
by again at a certain time as the result of inductive reasoning. Then, actions of
predictive trust may be defined thus: A’s action is an action of predictive trust when
in so acting A relies on S’s ϕ-ing and predictively expects S to ϕ. An action of
predictive trust may be the act of using a thermometer to find out one’s exact
temperature, or the act of not bringing water to a meeting because there is one
colleague who always brings enough for everyone, and so on.
But actions of trust can also be affective when the constitutive expectation is
normative, that is, when the expectation consists in assuming that “the trusted party
has certain [normative] motivations and act on the basis of these.” This is why the16
distinctive thought of the nurses in S2 is not ‘Kant will pass by’, but ‘Kant should pass
by’: their expectation appeals to Kant’s normative motivations to behave
trustworthily rather than to his mere regular behaviour. No prediction is essentially
involved there, but just a sort of demand concerning Kant’s behaviour. So here is a
definition for actions of affective trust: A’s action is an action of affective trusts when
in so acting A relies on S’s ϕ-ing and normatively expects S to ϕ. An action of
affective trust may be the act of handing money to a shopkeeper to get an apple in
return, or the act of giving credence to a witness because he has sworn to tell nothing
but the truth, and so on.
In conclusion, then, actions of affective trust share with actions of predictive trust the
fact that the trustor relies on the trusted party’s behaviour, and the fact that the
former positively expects something of the latter. Where the two differ from each
other is that in the first case, the trustor’s expectation is essentially normative, and so
she is entitled to have reactive attitudes towards the trusted when the trusted does
not satisfy her normative expectations: we can easily imagine the nurses
complaining to Kant ‘we trusted you – and you failed us!’. In cases of predictive
16 Faulkner 2014, p. 1978.
15 Faulkner 2007, p. 880.
14 Faulkner 2014, p. 1978.
13 Faulkner dubbed this kind of trust «affective» because of its association with the kind of reactive
attitudes that occur in affective, interpersonal relationships. See Faulkner 2014, p. 1978. We will see
how this reactive attitudes are characteristic of affective trust shortly.
ISSN: 2653-3146
26
Carbonell Actions of Trust and their Cognitive Motivation
trust, however, these reactive attitudes neither tend to arise nor do they justifiably
arise.17
3. A non-doxastic view of trust
3.1 Trust and the Humean account of motivation
Faulkner holds a non-doxastic view of trust, which means that he endorses the thesis
that trust needn’t involve nor entail the belief that S will ϕ. Specifically, he says so
with regards to actions of affective trust under circumstances of uncertainty: “when it
comes to acts of affective trust, the problem is that A can trust S to ϕ without... the
belief that S will ϕ.” This is the reason why, according to him, the Humean analysis18
cannot sometimes account for the cognitive motivation of actions of affective trust. In
a situation where A believes that S’s ϕ-ing is a means to the attainment of X and
where A is trusting S to ϕ (and trivially believes so) , it is clear that lacking the belief19
‘S will ϕ’ would impede A from having a means-end belief of the sort ‘if I trust S to ϕ,
I will get X’, which is precisely the sort of means-end belief that the Humean analysis
would require that A have to be motivated to trust.20
In effect, the Humean analysis states that a motivating reason for A to ψ consists in a
pair formed by a desire for an outcome X and a means-end belief representing her
ψ-ing as a means to the attainment of X. Michael Smith proposed the following
definition:
R at t constitutes a motivating reason of agent A to ψ iff there is some X such that R at
t consists of a desire of A to X and a belief that were he to ψ he would X 21
21 Smith 1987, p. 36. Notice I changed the original symbols of the quote to make them consistent with
both Faulkner’s and my symbolization. This change does not alter the original meaning of the quote,
and may even make it clearer.
20 The rationale is the following. If A believes ‘I am trusting S to ϕ’ then she cannot believe ‘if I trust S
to ϕ, S will ϕ’ unless she also believes ‘S will ϕ’. As a consequence, if A believes ‘if S ϕ-s, I will get X’
then she cannot believe ‘if I trust S to ϕ, I will get X’ unless she also believes ‘if I trust S to ϕ, S will ϕ’.
19 Strictly speaking, A’s trivial belief is not ‘I am trusting S to ϕ’, but the belief ‘I am ψ-ing’ where the
ψ-ing is an action of trust. Thus, for instance, the nurses in S2 would trivially believe that they are
giving the medicines to their patients right when they see Kant passing by the hospital. I will
henceforth use the verb ‘to trust’ and derivatives to refer to an action of trust unless it is made explicit
that the trusting in question refers to the attitude.
18 Faulkner 2014, p. 1979.
17 It may be helpful to note that “pure” actions of predictive trust (i.e., where the expectations had are
just predictive) very often involve objects rather than people. As Hollis points out, “we trust one
another to behave predictably in a sense that applies equally to the natural world at large. I trust my
apple tree to bear apples, not oranges.” (Hollis 1998, p. 10). This would partly explain why reactive
attitudes do not justifiably arise when only our predictive expectations are deceived –objects are out
of the realm of (social) normativity, and so their behaviour cannot be the object of justified resentment.
Basically, we cannot put a normative expectation on objects or animals. Normative expectations are
restricted to interpersonal relationships, and so it is affective trust.
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Thus, according to this analysis, why were the nurses motivated to affectively trust
Kant? In other words, why did they give the medicines to their patients when they
saw Kant passing by the hospital? Simply because they had a motivating reason of
the sort R. That is, because they desired to give the medicines to their patients on
time and believed something like ‘if we give the medicines to our patients when we
see Kant passing by the hospital, we will give the medicines on time’. However,
Faulkner points out, this could perfectly be otherwise.
Faulkner would say that the nurses’ action could have not been motivated by a
desire-belief pair of that type, because they might have lacked the kind of means-end
belief which constitutes R. In particular, they might have lacked a means-end belief
of the sort ‘if we give the medicines to our patients when we see Kant passing by the
hospital, we will give the medicines on time’ because they could have been uncertain
as to whether Kant would punctually pass by and, accordingly, they could have not
believed that Kant would eventually punctually pass by.22
So it seems that the Humean analysis cannot account for the cognitive motivation of
actions of affective trust under circumstances of uncertainty. According to this
analysis, as we have just seen, the acquisition of a means-end belief of the sort ‘if I23
trust S to ϕ, then I will get X’ in the specific situation considered imposes the
following conditions:
(C1) That A believes ‘S will ϕ’
(C2) That A believes ‘if I trust S to ϕ, then S will ϕ’
The problem is, however, that affective trust can be motivated even in the absence of
the belief ‘S will ϕ’ and the belief ‘if I trust S to ϕ, then S will ϕ ‘ due to its particular,
cognitive characteristics. I will now present Faulkner’s explanation of these
characteristics, and in Section 3 I will show how a weaker version of the Humean
analysis could accommodate them.
3.2 The cognitive characteristics of affective trust
Faulkner offers an illustration of a waiting husband to explain in detail the cognitive
characteristics of affective trust:
23 See footnote 19.
22 It is important to notice the difference between ‘not believing that p’ and ‘believing that not p’.
While the former means that one does not have a belief as of p (e.g., I don’t believe it’s raining), the
latter means that one has a belief as of not-p (e.g., I believe it’s not raining). Also, while the former is
not sufficient for the latter (someone may not believe that it’s raining and yet not believe that it’s not
raining –say, because she is uncertain about it because she has not yet collected sufficient evidence), it
seems the latter is in fact sufficient for the former (if someone believes it is not raining, then one does
not believe that it is raining). As we will see, this difference will play a crucial role in Faulkner's
proposal and should be kept in mind for the remainder of the paper.
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We are in the process of a messy divorce, and you were nothing but unreliable in the
plans you made with me in the past, so I have no confidence you will show up today.
This is not to suggest I believe that you will not show up; I might have no confidence
you will show but if I believed that you will not show it would be wrong to describe
my waiting as an act of trusting… [The husband] can decide to trust S to ϕ just
because trust need not involve the belief that S will ϕ.24
The relevant point being made in this illustration is that in affectively trusting his
wife to show up the husband needn’t believe that she will actually show up to be
motivated to wait for her. But why so? Why can the husband be motivated to25
affectively trust his wife to show up even though he does not believe that she will
eventually show? Mainly due to two factors: first, because in view of
counter-evidence one can have a normative expectation on someone’s behaviour
without having a predictive expectation; second, because affective trust can be
cognitively motivated solely by the presumption that the trusted will prove
trustworthy.
Contrary to the expectation of predictive trust, which consists in the belief that S will
ϕ, the husband’s normative expectation needn’t be grounded on sufficient evidence
for the belief that the wife will show. Whereas counter-evidence against the belief
that S will ϕ would make A withdraw a predictive expectation, the past unreliability
of the wife is not (to a certain point) sufficient for making the husband withdraw the
normative expectation he put on her. Simply, he can still think that the wife should
show up because they have arranged a meeting even though he does not believe that
she will actually show up. So having no confidence in his wife’s future behaviour
does not prevent him from putting a normative expectation on her, and so neither
does it prevent him from affectively trusting her. What is more, having no26
confidence does not prevent the husband from presuming that his wife will show up.
And this is key to Faulkner’s proposal.
According to him, the fact “that affective trust implies a presumption of
trustworthiness is important, because presumption is not constrained in the same
way as belief”. In particular, it is important because the presumption is not27
evidentially-constrained in the same fashion as belief is. Thus “A can continue, up to
a point, to think well of S even in the absence of evidence, or even in the face of
27 Faulkner 2007, p. 884.
26 The relation between S’s being unreliable and A’s affective trust on S is complex. I tried to capture
this complexity with the qualification ‘to a certain point’ between brackets. I contend that unreliability
can only make A withdraw her affective trust if it is sufficient to make her believe that S will not ϕ. As
long as it permits just not believing that S will ϕ, A can still hold to her assumption that S should be
normatively motivated to ϕ.
25 The other point being that trust (both predictive and affective) requires not believing that S will not
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counter-evidence” . This is why Faulkner suggests that making this presumption28
about S’s future ϕ-ing is like accepting that S will ϕ, and not like believing that S will
ϕ –namely, because (contrary to believing) one can accept that proposition p obtains
even in the face of counter-evidence. As Cohen explains, “a person who does not
fully believe that p can nevertheless justifiably accept that p” since to accept that p is29
just “to have or adopt a policy of deeming, positing, or postulating that p –that is, of
going along with that proposition”.30
Therefore, someone who accepts that p can happily ignore the evidence available
about the likelihood of not-p and act on the acceptance that p, because going along
with p simply means to act as if p were true. And this is what the husband of the
illustration does: “in trusting his wife the husband brackets his belief that his wife
will in all likelihood not show, and brackets those beliefs that give him reason for
thinking this, and gives his wife the benefit of the doubt.” Thus, the husband can31
think that she should show up and at the same time presume or accept that she will,
even though the evidence makes him not believe that she will in fact show up.32
Then, Faulkner concludes, if the husband can be cognitively motivated to wait for
her and rely on her showing up to accomplish a certain intention of his thereby, no
matter how uncertain or wary he might feel about it, is precisely because he can just
hold to the presumption that she will eventually show. As Faulkner remarks, “this
background of acceptance then specifies a way of thinking about trusting S to ϕ,
which provides A with a motivation for so doing”. Now, someone may ask whether33
this would “really count as trust”. The reason being that if the husband does not
believe that she will not let him down, then he is not really trusting his wife. My
response to this question is that the husband does trust her wife, although to merely
say that he trusts her can be philosophically misleading.
Our trust talk presents two competing criteria for when to say that someone is
trusting. On the one hand, for example, we say of someone that trusts when she
believes that the trusted party will not let her down. That is to say, when A believes
that S will ϕ, she has the confidence that S will ϕ. Is in this sense that we usually say
that our friends are the ones in which we can trust. On the other hand, however, we
also say of someone that trusts when she lacks certainty about whether the trusted
party will let her down or not. When A does not believe that S will ϕ, for instance,
33 Ibid., p. 1987.
32 Notice that the issue here addressed is deep down related to Michael Smith’s moral problem. The
moral problem evidences how having a normative reason to ϕ does not necessarily motivate one to ϕ.
Thus, from the belief that ‘S should ϕ’ one cannot derive the belief ‘S will ϕ’ because S might not be
even motivated to ϕ. One can justifiably believe the former and yet lack grounds to believe the latter.
See Smith 1994.
31 Faulkner 2014, p. 1986.
30 Cohen 1989, p. 368.
29 Ibid., p. 369.
28 Faulkner 2020, p. 338.
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we say that all she can do is to trust that S will eventually ϕ. And this is actually
something that can happen in contexts where S’s ϕ-ing is normatively constrained.
As Faulkner puts it, in such contexts A might not believe that S will ϕ and yet believe
that S should ϕ, which allows us to say of A that she trusts S to ϕ –in particular, that
A affectively trusts S to ϕ. So my reply is that our trust talk sometimes does not allow
us to see how trust can be grounded solely on normative expectations. If we only
attend to one of the criteria we may overlook the other one and conclude that lack of
confidence entails absence of trust, as if there was just one kind of trust.
4. Trust, competence, and intentionality
4.1 Two types of means-end beliefs
The notion of a means-end belief as stated in Smith’s schema may be ambiguous. It
strikes me that it can refer to two different types of beliefs that express different
degrees of certainty about outcome. I will now show why Faulkner’s proposal is
only correct as long as it concerns means-end beliefs of the stronger type. And in the
next subsection I will argue for the claim that the cognitive motivation for actions of
affective trust in the kind of situation considered could be provided by a means-end
beliefs of the weaker type.
On a stronger conception, the belief would be ‘if A ψ-s, then A will get X’. When this
belief is applied to the illustration of the husband, it could be rendered as, say, ‘if I
wait for my wife to show up, I will get the divorce papers signed’. And, on a weaker
conception, the belief can be stated as ‘if A ψ-s, then it is possible that A gets X’,
which is roughly rendered as ‘if I wait for my wife to show up, then it is possible that
I get the divorce papers signed’. The difference between these two types of beliefs
should be understood thus: while the former represents the action of trust as
ensuring the attainment of X, the latter represents it as merely making it possible.
One who had this latter belief would therefore be more uncertain about the outcome
of her action than someone who had the former.
Having established this distinction, it is easy to see how Faulkner’s proposal does
not apply to means-end beliefs of the weak type and, more importantly for my
purposes, why it would not rule out the application of a weaker Humean analysis.
Borrowing from the last section, the acquisition of the belief ‘if I trust S to ϕ, then it is
possible that I get X’ imposes the following conditions:
(C1’) That A believes ‘it is possible that S ϕ-s’
(C2’) That A believes ‘if I trust S to ϕ, then it is possible that S ϕ-s’
And, as I see it, not believing that S will ϕ does not impede one from satisfying C1’
and C2’. Basically, lacking the belief ‘S will ϕ’ is compatible with believing that it is
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possible for S to ϕ. So even in a situation where the husband lacks confidence he
could perfectly believe that it is at least possible for his wife to show up, and so he
could also believe that it is possible that his wife will show up if he waits for her. In
turn, these beliefs would allow him to believe in the possibility of getting the divorce
papers signed if he waits for her.
So, put simply, it seems plausible that even if the husband is so uncertain that he
does not believe ‘my wife will show up’, he could still have a weak means-end belief
of the sort ‘if I wait for my wife, then it is possible that I get the divorce papers
signed’  just in virtue of satisfying C1’ and C2’.
4.2 Doxastic conditions for trust
If I am right, then, it seems that trustors can have this weak means-end belief even
under circumstances of uncertainty as long as they can also believe in the
aforementioned possibilities. But I want to contend something else, namely, that
trustors in this context need in fact to have these three beliefs. Consequently, I want to
defend that a weaker version of the Humean analysis, according to which having a
motivating reason Rw to act is to have a desire and a weak means-end belief, could
account for the cognitive motivation of actions of affective trust performed in these
situations.
So to justify these claims I will need to explain why in affectively trusting S to ϕ, A
needs to have the weak means-end belief in question, which in turn will require that
I explain why A needs to satisfy C1’ and C2’. That the latter holds can be seen in the
fact that trust involves reliance on others’ competence, and that the former is the case
can be seen in the fact that belief in the possibility of the intended is necessary for
intending. Let’s consider each fact in turn.
I proposed that when trust is practical, and not merely attitudinal, the trustor relies
on the trusted party doing something. So here I want to follow Baier in claiming34
that this reliance is reliance on another’s competence. Since relying on S’s ϕ-ing is
relying on her capabilities to behave in a particular way; and since ‘being competent
to ϕ’ means being capable to behave in the relevant ways as to ϕ, I take Baier’s
approach to be right. So, for instance, when the husband waits for his wife to show
up with the intention of having the divorce papers signed, he is relying on her
capabilities to properly behave so as to show up. In order to affectively trust her, the
husband needs to believe that she is capable of showing up (thus satisfying C1’) such
that, since he trivially believes that he is waiting for her, he also needs to believe that
if he waits for her it is at least possible that she shows up (thus satisfying C2’).
34 Baier 1986, p. 259.
ISSN: 2653-3146
32
Carbonell Actions of Trust and their Cognitive Motivation
The first reason that I take to favour these requirements that follow from the
considerations around competence and trust is that not satisfying C1’ would imply
that the husband is not trusting his wife, but distrusting her. In effect, if A were to
believe that S cannot ϕ, A would consequently believe that S will not ϕ and so A’s
attitude would be rather described as distrust. Instead of a positive expectation, A
would have a negative expectation and her action could not qualify as an action of
trust at all. And the second reason is that these requirements seeman to
accommodate some doxastic implications concerning normative expectations as
involved in actions of trust. In cases of affective trust, where the attitude consists in
the belief that S should ϕ, it seems that A needs to satisfy C1’ because of the intuitive
principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Believing that S should ϕ, that S is somehow
obligated to ϕ, presupposes believing that it is possible for S to ϕ because a true
normative demand seems to requires so.
I also proposed that the distinguishing feature of trust as an action is that it involves
an intention-specific relation of reliance, as the trustor relies on the trusted party to
accomplish an intention of hers. Since this intentionality is characteristic of actions of
trust, I claim that they are doxastically constrained in a particular way because
intending requires the satisfaction of a doxastic condition of some kind. This35
condition, I suggest with philosophers like Moya or Davidson , is that for an agent36
to intend to get X by means of ψ-ing it is necessary (and sometimes sufficient) to
believe that it is at least possible for her to get X by means of ψ-ing. Thus, for
instance, when the husband waits for his wife to show up with the intention of
having the divorce papers signed, he needs to believe that it is possible for him to get
them signed if he waits for his wife. He would therefore need to believe ‘if I wait for
her to show up, it is possible that I get the divorce papers signed’.
If this conclusion that follows from the relationship between intentionality and trust
seems plausible to me is because it sounds reasonable that failing to satisfy the
doxastic condition suggested would be enough for the husband to decide not to
affectively trust his wife. In effect, just like a rational agent would not intend to win
the Christmas lottery if she deemed it literally impossible to win (say, because she
knew it was rigged), it seems that the husband would not trust his wife with the
intention of getting the papers signed if he considered it literally impossible to have
them signed thereby (say, because he knew that she suffers from an extreme
psychological condition that prevents her from meeting any normative demand
whatsoever).
Moreover, the conclusion also seems plausible because it is able to account for the
trustors’ behaviour in cases where they have been let down. For instance, it can
explain why someone in the husband’s shoes would insist on meeting the wife
36 See Moya 1990 and Davidson 2002.
35 This doxastic condition has taken several forms in the literature. See Mele 2010 for an overview.
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despite her past unreliability. Since he believes that it is possible for him to get to see
her if he trusts her, even if he finds the chances quite low and does not believe that
she will eventually turn up, he can still be motivated to engage in whatever
compensatory behaviour is needed to accomplish his intention. He could, for
example, be willing to rearrange a meeting and try his luck one more time. After all,
as pointed earlier in brackets, on some occasions belief in the possibility of the
intended can be sufficient to intend it, and on this occasion I would say that this
belief is not only necessary but also sufficient for the husband to intend to have the
papers signed by means of engaging in trusting activity with his wife.37
At this point, then, I can suggest the following weak Humean analysis of the
husband’s action of affective trust. Why did the husband wait for his wife to show
up even though he did not believe that she would show up? Because he had a
motivating reason of the sort Rw. That is, because he desired to have the divorce
papers signed and believed something like ‘if I wait for my wife to show up, then it
is possible that I get them signed’. In view of his desire, this weak means-end belief
could have cognitively motivated him to affectively trust his wife, or so I hope to
have shown.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have primarily done two things. First, I have developed the difference
between trust as an attitude and trust as an action, and have identified in what exact
sense reliance is related to trust. I have also provided a systematic account of actions
of trust, emphasizing the role of intentions and attitudes in defining the nature of the
action. And, second, I have presented and assessed Faulkner’s position about the
practical rationality of trust. I have followed him in that trust needn’t involve the
belief that S will ϕ, and offered the more positive proposal that it does need to
involve the belief that it is possible that S ϕ-s. I concluded on this basis that, in order
to perform the actions of trust he had in mind under circumstances of uncertainty, it
is at least necessary that the trustor ascribes a weak instrumental value to her
trusting.
While the husband’s trust can be motivated even if he is uncertain as to whether his
wife will eventually show up and prove herself trustworthy (even if he does not
believe that), it cannot be cognitively motivated if he is uncertain about the
37 Moya offers an enlightening illustration to explain this point. He explains that one can intend to hit
a very far target by shooting an arrow even though one might not believe that one will hit it. Thus, he
remarks, “in having an intention I commit myself either to make (if I think I will be able) or to try to
make (if I do not think I will be able) its content true” (Moya 1990, p. 138). The point being that even a
small prospect of success (which implies belief in the possibility of succeeding, and not in its
probability) can, at least sometimes, be sufficient for intending. Now, it is worth noting that this is a
contentious claim and some would say that the doxastic condition proposed is too weak if considered
sufficient. For instance, see Grice 1971. For further discussion see Davidson 2002.
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possibilities of her showing up and his getting the papers signed if he trusts her (if
he does not believe that). Otherwise put, while he can bracket evidence against her
future showing up or about the unlikelihood of his having the papers signed, he
cannot likewise obviate evidence against these possibilities. The fact that actions of
trust involve reliance on the trusted party’s competence and the fact that this reliance
is intention-specific seems to me to have this doxastic impact on trustors. Having
these beliefs, I claim, is a necessary and sometimes sufficient condition for
cognitively motivating actions of trust under the circumstances of uncertainty that
Faulkner considers.
And it is important to underscore the ‘sometimes’ in this conclusion. For the
question may be raised as to whether having this set of beliefs is a sufficient
condition for trust in any context. For instance, someone could claim that one would
not be motivated to entrust her daughter to a suspicious babysitter only in virtue of
having these beliefs. It is certainly plausible that in a situation where one senses ill
will on the part of the trusted party one would not be motivated to trust, such that
perhaps believing that the trusted party holds goodwill towards us must be also a
necessary condition for trusting in situations of this kind. Now, however interesting38
this issue may be, I have to reply that I did not purport to provide a set of
individually necessary and conjointly sufficient doxastic conditions for every context
of trust. I just focused on one particular situation characterised by the uncertainty of
the trustor in relation to the trusted party’s behaviour, and so I deliberately set aside
any further question about necessity and sufficiency.39
39 This paper is based on a fragment of my Bachelor Thesis, which I defended at the University of
València in June 2021. Consequently, there are many people to whom I am indebted. Special thanks to
Sergi Rosell for supervising the thesis, and to Paul Faulkner and Tobies Grimaltos for commenting on
a previous draft and discussing some of the points addressed here. I am also grateful to Marta
Cabrera and Eric Olson for helpful discussion, and to the members of the thesis tribunal Chon Tejedor
and Jordi Valor. Some parts of this paper were presented at the 3rd UPJA Virtual Conference for
Undergraduate Philosophy, to whose audience I thank their valuable questions. This paper has also
been improved with the suggestions of the anonymous referees.
38 This is in fact Baier’s proposal, which I do not consider thoroughly promising. For, as I see it, it is
not clear whether every action of trust requires assuming goodwill on the part of the trusted. For
example, a very influential political prisoner can trust his captors will release him if he discloses some
important information about his country’s tactics. The point being that he can do this even if he
assumes ill will on the part of his captors. See Baier 1986.
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